A Symposium on the Fair Trade Laws: Part III: Enforcement and Procedure by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 27 Issue 1 Article 6 
1958 
A Symposium on the Fair Trade Laws: Part III: Enforcement and 
Procedure 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
A Symposium on the Fair Trade Laws: Part III: Enforcement and Procedure, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 81 (1958). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol27/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
less than a ton or a yard. Such resales could be in conflict with the
Robinson-Patman Act62 and state laws forbidding price discrimination.
The numerous ambiguities that have arisen out of conflicting interpreta-
tions of the language in the fair trade acts call for clarification. There is
now pending before Congress a bill that would define more certainly
some of these controversial terms, at least as they apply in interstate
commerce. This desirable feature of the bill, notwithstanding, other of its
provisions render its enactment doubtful.6 3
PART III: ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEDURE
ENFORCEMENT POLICY
In the enforcement of fair trade prices, many fair traders operate on the
principle that prevention is better than cure.' A vigorous enforcement
policy generally will force the majority of price cutters to adhere to the
fair trade price without resorting to legal action.' Knowledge that an
alleged violation has occurred is generally obtained by the producer
through complaints received from his own salesmen, from wholesalers
and from competitors of the alleged violator. Many associations in large
cities have fair trade committees which aid in obtaining information about
price violations.3 The procedure followed by the enforcer upon receipt
of the complaint is usually one which attempts to preclude possible
defenses if legal action should become necessary. A registered or certified
letter is sent to the alleged violator telling him that a complaint has been
received, advising him of the fair trade retail price and requesting that
the price cutting stop immediately. The violater is then "shopped" by
an agent of the manufacturer who attempts to buy the product at a dis-
count in order to substantiate the truth of the allegation. If the price
cutting has continued, either a stern letter warning of legal action is
sent or the price cutter is contacted personally. If all warnings go
unheeded, then the strong enforcer will resort to litigation or take other
measures to prevent the price cutting.
One method of indirect enforcement is the refusal to sell 4 Inasmuch
as the provisions of the fair trade acts are permissive in that it is theo-
retically optional with the manufacturer to originate fair trade contracts5
62. 15 U.S.C.A. § 13c 7 (1953).
63. See Part IV: Indirect Methods of Evading the Fair Trade Laws pp. 110, 111.
1. Weigel, The Fair Trade Laws 76 (1938).
2. See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 316, 335 (1955), for a description of enforcement pro-
cedures frequently used.
3. See FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance 218-49, 361-406 (1945).
4. See Weigel, The Fair Trade Laws 30 (1938); Comment, 58 Yale LJ. 1121 (1949).
5. See note 49 infra; see also Note, 36 Cornell L.Q. 781, 793-94 (1951) briefly pointing
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and he is under no obligation to sell to a retailer not of his own choosing,
the courts will generally not deny relief to the manufacturer where the
defense of refusal to sell has been interposed by the defendant retailer.6
However, the courts are circumspect when dealing with this problem
since its ramifications may encompass the antitrust. laws.7 In addition,
a lone producer would benefit little from such a refusal as it might result
in loss of markets and would be practically futile against the large retail
outlets which go to great lengths to obtain goods.8
In order to enforce the fair trade price against violators who continue
to price cut, resort may be had to legal action. A few states authorize
government officials to enforce the contracts.9 While the Federal Trade
Commission has consistently taken the position that it would not act to
enforce fair trade prices," legislation has recently been introduced to
out some of the methods available to retailers to force the manufacturer to fair trade his
products.
6. The Parker Pen Co. v. Charles Appliances, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Ampex Corp. v. Goody Audio Center, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 1072, 163 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct.
1957). But see Lentheric, Inc. v. Weissbard, 122 N.J. Eq. 573, 195 At. 818 (Ch. 1937) vwhere
the court under similar circumstances denied relief to the manufacturer on the general
principle that "he who seeks equity must do equity."
In a recent case the court placed an affirmative duty on the manufacturer to refuse to sell,
holding that the manufacturer who did not show that it had minimized its alleged losses by
refusing to sell to price cutting noncontracting retailers was not entitled to injunctive relief.
Calvert Distillers Co. v. Wish, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1957 Trade Cas.) ii 68921 (NJ). Ill.
Nov. 14, 1957). See also Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc.
342, 2 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (dictum).
A refusal to sell to a certain class of retailers will not afford a defense where the
manufacturer considered it sound business policy. For example, in Revlon Nail Enamel Corp.
v. Charmley Drug Shop, 123 N.J. Eq. 301, 197 Atl. 661 (Ch. 1938), the enforcing party's
principal outlets were beauty parlors which would not push the plaintiff's product if it were
also sold by drug stores.
7. In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) the
Court stated that a concerted refusal to sell by two manufacturers was a violation of
the Sherman Act. Refusal to deal is generally allowed where the manufacturer has acted
individually. Id. at 214 (dictum).
For an excellent discussion of the antitrust aspects of this problem see Seitz, Exclusive
Arrangements and Refusal to Deal Problems, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 85, 98 (1957); Barber,
Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 847, 857-58 (1955).
8. Weigel, The Fair Trade Laws 32 (1938).
9. Idaho Code Ann. § 48-310 (Supp. 1957); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 362.14 (West Supp.
1956); Utah Code Ann. § 13-2-11 (1953); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 39-308 (1945).
10. Where an association of retail jewelers notified the Federal Trade Commission that
fair trade was being discriminately enforced in their industry, the Commission refused to
investigate, pointing out ". . . it [the McGuire Act] does not in terms prohibit any practices nor
require the Commission to take corrective action towards proscribed activities. . . . The
Commission has consistently taken the position that it is not within the province of
the Federal Trade Commission to exercise control over resale price agreements nor to enforce
such agreements." 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed. 1956) ff 3020.90 at 4130 (1955).
make that group responsible for enforcement."1 Passage of such legisla-
tion would remove the burden of enforcement from private litigants where
it has rested for the most part since the inception of the fair trade laws.
At the present time, in addition to the cause of action which the manufac-
turer has against the contracting retailers who have violated the fair
trade contract, actions may also be based upon the unfair competition
provision of the state and local fair trade acts by any person damaged
thereby.12 Not only may individual retailers bring suit against non-
signers,'3 but the action may be brought even where the suing retailer
is himself a nonsigner.' 4 The suit may be brought by ". . . the owner
or holder of the brands or marks or by one having the exclusive right to
use such marks in a given territory."1 5 This may be the manufacturer,
producer, distributor, wholesaler or retailer. An association of retailers
is a proper party 6 and has been permitted to sue as the representative of
injured retailers.17
REQUIREMENTS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION
In order to set forth a cause of action, the plaintiff in a fair trade suit
must prove the existence of a fair trade contract.' 8 He must show the
parties to the contract and that the trade-marked commodity is in free
and open competition.' 9 The price must be a fixed or stipulated price
binding on the retailer and cannot be one merely suggested or recom-
mended."0 The plaintiff must also show that the defendant was notified of
the existence of the contract and of the stipulated prices.2 '
11. See Part IV: Indirect Methods of Evading the Fair Trade Laws pp. 110, 111.
12. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369-b. In order to establish that he has been damaged,
a retailer suing a nonsigning retailer must show that the offending party is a competitor.
The cases define no rule to determine the extent of competition necessary. See also notes
28-30 infra. In Friedman v. Peller, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1951 Trade Cas.) ff 62776 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1951), it was declared to be sufficient that the damaged party be in the same
general vicinity as the offender and need not be in the immediate vicinity.
13. Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros. Fruiterers, Inc., 281 N.Y. 101,
22 N.E.2d 253 (1939).
14. Burstein v. Charline's Cut Rate, 126 N.J. Eq. 560, 10 A.2d 646 (Ch. 1940).
15. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 345, 2
N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
16. Office Mach. Dealers Ass'n Inc. v. Tytell Typewriter Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(1948 Trade Cas.) ff 62344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
17. Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. May's Drug Stores, Inc., 229 Iowa 554, 294 N.W. 756
(1940).
18. Charmley Drug Shop v. Guerlain, Inc., 113 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1940).
19. Lionel Corp. v. S. Klein on the Square, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1953 Trade
Cas.) ff 67412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
20. Magazine Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbard, 125 NJ. Eq. 593, 7 A.2d 411 (Ch. 1939);
General Elec. Co. v. S. Klein on the Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S. 2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
21. An injunction may not be issued in the absence of a finding that the defendant had
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By merely reciting the inverse of the fair trade nonsigner clause, it
may be assumed that a retailer may advertise, offer for sale or sell a fair
trade item at less than the stipulated price where he does not do so
knowingly and if so, does not willfully violate a known fair trade agree-
ment.2 Thus, it is apparent that a retailer, in order to be bound by a
fair trade agreement, must have actual knowledge of the agreement and
of the prices stipulated therein and mere constructive notice is not
sufficient.2 3
Normally, the burden is upon the enforcing party to adequately allege
and prove that a defendant-retailer has actual knowledge of the prices
stipulated in the fair trade agreement before he will be granted injunc-
tive relief for alleged price violations.24 Thus, where a noncontracting
retailer was sought to be enjoined, allegations "upon information and
belief" that the defendant-retailer had notice of the prices of the fair
traded items were insufficient.2 5 Where a retailer has seen any instrument
sufficient to impart notice to him of an existing fair trade agreement and
of the prices fixed for the items covered thereby, such as a profit and loss
chart issued by the manufacturer or a copy of a fair trade contract, the
defense of lack of knowledge will fail.2 6
actual knowledge of the fair trade agreement. Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 91 F. Supp. 81
(M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950); Weco Products Co. v. Sam's
Cut Rate, Inc., 296 Mich. 190, 295 N.W. 611 (1941). For a suggested definition of "actual
notice" see MacLachlan, A New Approach to Resale Price Maintenance, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 145,
148 (1957), proposing a uniform national approach to resale price maintenance. See also
H.R. 10527, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(5) (1958).
22. "Noncontractors are bound by the contract '... only to the extent that the statute
makes the contract binding upon them'-specifically, as to that provision in the contract
which relates to the price of the commodity." Note, 36 Cornell L.Q. 781, 785 (1951).
23. Mailing of notice is presumptive evidence of the receipt of knowledge of the fair trade
agreement and the stipulated prices contained therein, which may be rebutted by a specific
denial. Magazine Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbard, 125 N.J. Eq. 593, 7 A.2d 411 (Ch.
1939). Cf. Bulova Watch Co. v. Anderson, 270 Wis. 21, 70 N.W.2d 243 (1955) where
registered mail was used.
In the recent English case of County Laboratories Ltd. v. J. Mindel Ltd., [19571 2 Weekly
L.R. 541, Justice Harman, construing the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz.
2, c. 68, § 25 which is similar to the McGuire Act, referred to the general rule that the
equitable doctrines of constructive notice were not to be extended to purely commercial
transactions and stated, "taking with notice . . . means taking with express knowledge, and
not being put on inquiry and being therefore fixed with what would have been ascertained
if the inquiry had been pushed to its reasonable limit." For an excellent discussion of the
general status of resale price maintenance in England, see Morrison, Commercial Restrictions
in English Law, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1957).
24. Weco Products Co. v. Sam's Cut Rate, Inc., 296 Mich. 190, 295 N.W. 611 (1941).
25. Citarella v. Bryant Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc., 103 N.Y.L.J. p. 2868, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1940); Miller v. Coliseum Wine & Liquor Store, Inc., 103 N.Y.L.J. p. 2721, col. 1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1940).
26. Ampex Corp. v. Goody Audio Center, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 1072, 163 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup.
Under a literal interpretation of the nonsigner clause, one fair trade
contract is sufficient to bind every retailer in the state who has knowledge
of such an agreement.27 However, where the retailer has cut prices the
courts will generally limit the granting of an injunction against both
contracting and noncontracting retailers, to cases where notice has been
uniform within the area of the retailers competitive trading.2 8 Where
the defendant noncontracting retailer has himself adequately received
notice, he may not rely on the fact that all his competitors have not been
notified of the manufacturer's fair trade contract to substantiate a defense
of lack of knowledge.29 It should follow that in a suit by a manufacturer,
his lack of diligence in notifying other noncontracting retailers would
give rise to a successful defense of discriminatory or inadequate enforce-
ment."0 Also the defendant-retailer might show that price cutting was
prevalent among his competitors and that it was necessary for him to
cut prices to meet competition."' On the other hand, where the retailer
Ct. 1957). No particular form of notice is required. Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 91 F. Supp.
81 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950). But the notice should
specify a specific fair trade contract. General Elec. Co. v. Fain, CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(1955 Trade Cas.) II 68192 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1955). In General Elec. Co. v. Golden Rule
Appliance Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1955 Trade Cas.) ff 68068 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955),
knowledge of the fair traded prices was evidenced by the fact that purchasers of the retailer
were required to sign a certification that they were buying for commercial purposes and not
for resale. If a noncontracting retailer knows that another retailer had made a fair trade
contract, and is himself given a form of the contract which contains the terms, he has
sufficient knowledge, Sunbeam Corp v. Wentling, supra. Where a noncontracting retailer
received a letter advising it of a fair trade contract and enclosing an undated, unsigned form
of the contract there was sufficient knowledge. Seagrams-Distillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp.,
2 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
27. In Revlon Nail Enamel Corp. v. Charmley Drug Shop, 123 N.J. Eq. 301, 197 AtI.
661 (Ch. 1938), plaintiff had made one fair trade contract with a retailer who sold less than
twelve bottles of nail polish in three months. The court held that the contract was sufficient
to bind all other retailers who had knowledge of it. Cf. California Oil Co. v. Reingold, 5 N.J.
Super. 525, 68 A.2d 572 (Ch. 1949).
28. Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Remington Putnam Co., 186 Md. 210, 215, 46 A.2d 101, 103
(1946); Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 346, 2
N.Y.S.2d 320, 325 (Sup. Ct. 1938). See also note 12 supra.
29. Contra, Frank Fischer Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 105, 19
A.2d 454 (Ch. 1941), where the defendant retailer successfully interposed the defense that
all the other retailers competing in the same state had not been informed of the fair trade
agreement of which he had knowledge.
30. The defendant noncontracting retailer will, however, face considerable difficulty in
this respect if he is being sued by other retailers. See notes 55-56 infra.
31. Schimpf v. R. H. Macy & Co., 166 Misc. 654, 2 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup Ct.), order rev'd,
6 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1st Dep't 1938). The courts, however, have allowed the defense of meeting
competition only under the most compelling circumstances. In such a situation the retailer
would seem to be on a more solid legal footing where he has notified his competitors of the
fair trade agreement if necessary and brought injunctive proceedings against competing
violators where he has been damaged by their price cutting. See 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
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has upheld the fair trade contract, he may take the initiative against
competing retailers. Under the terms of the act there is nothing to
prevent such a retailer who is bound by a fair trade agreement from
imparting sufficient notice of the agreement to his competitors32 and even
bringing suit against them himself where he has been damaged by their
violations after they have received sufficient knowledge of the fair trade
agreement. 33
As a practical matter where a defendant-retailer is shown to have
"knowingly" violated a fair trade agreement injunctive relief will be
granted. However, where the defendant-retailer is able to show absence
of an intent to violate the agreement, this will constitute a complete
defense.34 Thus, where a retailer had posted established prices but had
sold the goods at lower prices suggested by agents of the distributor or
where the enforcing party's contradictory instructions contributed to the
alleged violation, injunctive relief will be denied.35 Where a retailer is
able to raise a reasonable doubt as to an alleged willful violation a
temporary injunction should not be granted; 36 but where the retailer
pleads that his employees or servants have undersold fair traded items
either through inexperience or inadvertence such will apparently con-
stitute no defense. 3
7
Where the retailer has previously been enjoined, the introduction of
the previous enjoining decrees to show the deliberate character of the
defendant-retailer's breach of the fair trade agreement has been held
proper.38 Similarly in Donner v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,39 a criminal
(10th ed. 1956) ff 3448 for listing of cases where the defense of meeting competition was
successful; see also notes 32-33 infra.
32. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Stockman, 26 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). Cf. Ampex
Corp. v. Goody Audio Center, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 1072, 163 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
33. See notes 12-14 supra.
34. Johnson & Johnson v. Webster Cut Rate Drug Stores, Inc., 98 N.Y.L.J. 2184, col.
2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). The courts are not in general agreement as to willful violations where
the retailer cuts his prices because of economic necessity. See note 31 supra. In Ray Kline,
Inc. v. Davega-City Radio, Inc., 168 Misc. 185, 4 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the court
held that the defendant-retailer was not a willful violator where it was forced to cut prices
because of the chaotic condition of business. But cf. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Stockman,
26 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
35. Schenley Distributors, Inc. v. H. Hollander Co., 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.
1956) 9 3268.23 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1940).
36. National Distillers Products Corp. v. Brandie-Wine Stores Inc., 99 N.Y.L.J. p. 601,
col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). See Revere Camera v. Members Purchasing Corp., CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. (1955 Trade Cas.) f 67947 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). But see General Elec. Co.
v. Schreibman, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67915 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
37. General Elec. Co. v. All-American Sales, Inc., 235 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1956); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. H. & B. Radio Corp., 102 N.Y.L.J. p. 375, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).
38. Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. May's Drug Stores, Inc., 229 Iowa 554, 294 N.W. 756
(1940).
39. 196 Md. 475, 77 A.2d 305 (1950).
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action for the violation of a previous injunction, the court stated that
because the defendant-retailer knew of the previous one year trade
agreement which they had formerly violated, there was a "... presump-
tion of fact that something which has been proved to exist continues to
exist for a reasonable time. . . . This is known as the presumption of
continuance, and it is held to be not a legal presumption but a matter of
the burden of proof. 40 In the Donner case the second violation occurred
over a year and a half after the issuing of the first injunction. During
that time the manufacturer had notified the retailer of its fair trade
policy and a price list was sent to the retailer about four months before
the violation. While the retailer was never explicitly informed that the
previous one year fair trade contract had been renewed, the court reasoned
that there should have been an inference or presumption of continuance
in this particular case and that it was incumbent upon the defendant to
disprove the existence of such an inference or presumption.
The evidentiary point enumerated by the Donner decision is partic-
ularly appropriate where indeterminable or short term fair trade con-
tracts are in question. Once a noncontracting retailer has known of the
existence of a fair trade contract there should be a presumption in favor
of the manufacturer that the retailer's knowledge of the contract has
continued to exist contemporaneously with the existence of the contract
itself.41 The ramifications of this point would also extend to situations
where price changes have occurred in the fair trade contract. Once the
contracting or noncontracting retailer has known of an established fair
trade price, there should be a presumption in the retailer's favor that the
price which the retailer was orighially informed of continues to be the
price at which he was bound.4 It has been suggested that the burden
of proving lack of knowledge should be uniformly placed upon the
retailer as a matter of convenience to facilitate the enforcement of price
maintenance. 43 It is unlikely that this principle will be adopted by a
majority of the courts inasmuch as the party seeking to enforce the
40. Id. at 480, 77 A.2d at 311.
41. Cf. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Harvard Stores, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1950
Trade Cas.) ff 62664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). See Wigmore, Evidence § 437 (1940). "Proof of
the existence of . . . an object, a condition, or a tendency at a given iie raises a presumption
that it continued for as long as is usual with things of that nature." Richardson, Evidence
§ 78 at 50 (7th ed. 1948).
42. That both the contracting and noncontracting retailer must have knowledge of the
prices contained in the fair trade contract and of the changes therein, see Ampex Corp.
v. Goody Audio Center, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 1072, 163 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Calvert
Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 2 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
43. Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939); Seagrams-
Distillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., 2 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938). See also Note, 52 Harv. L.
Rev. 284, 293 (1938).
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fair trade contract is seeking an extraordinary remedy, one existing by
virtue of statute alone. It would seem logical both in precedent and
principle that it should be incumbent upon the enforcing party to bear the
burden of proving notice if it wishes to qualify for the benefits of the
act.44
Very often the time of notice is of decisive importance. Generally,
where a noncontracting retailer purchases fair traded goods prior to
knowing that they were fair traded commodities, the stipulated prices
need not be observed even though the retailer subsequently learned that
the items were fair traded prior to his reselling the goods.45 Where there
is a dispute as to the time when notice was acquired, a temporary injunc-
tion will not be granted.4 6 However, pleading that notice of the fair trade
agreement was acquired after purchase of the fair traded items is
properly a matter of defense and it is not necessary for the enforcing
party to plead the time of notice.
47
DEFENSES TO THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Defenses are often raised which question the enforcement policy of
the manufacturer. Very often a fair trading manufacturer will be tempted
to pursue discriminatory enforcement procedures which may be profit-
able to him.48 Because of massive distribution techniques through various
and diverse outlets, it may be economically feasible for the manufacturer
to pursue a diligent enforcement policy against smaller retailers in
deference to larger distributors while retaining the benefits of the fair
44. Miles Cal. Co. v. Benatars, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1952 Trade Cas.) fi 67226 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1952).
45. Charmley Drug Shop v. Guerlain, Inc., 113 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1940); Delaware
v. Klein, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1956 Trade Cas.) 11 68406 (Del. Ch. 1956); The Lionel
Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304 (1954) ; Cluett, Peabody
& Co. v. J. W. Mays, Inc., 5 A.D.2d 140, 170 N.Y.S.2d 255 (2d Dep't 1958). Contra, Barron
Motors, Inc. v. May's Drug Stores, Inc., 227 Iowa 1344, 291 N.W. 152 (1940). See Calvert
Distillers Corp. v. Goldman, 255 Wis. 69,37 N.W.2d 859 (1949) (dictum).
46. Kamkap, Inc. v. Two Guys From Harrison, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1954 Trade
Cas. ff 67790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). But cf. E. I. de Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Brans-
combe, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1954 Trade Cas.) f 67912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
47. James Heddon's -Sons v. Callender, 29 F. Supp. 579 (D. Minn. 1939); Seagrams-
Distillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., 2 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
48. This discussion will encompass both lack of enforcement and favoritism in enforce-
ment policies. Both may be considered as discriminatory practices. While the problem of
discrimination revolves primarily around the procedures employed by the manufacturer to
insure that his fair trade contracts are upheld, under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 13(a) (1953), the practice of selling the same commodity to favored or disfavored
distributors or retailers at different price levels is also considered as a mode of discrimination.
Section 13(e) of the act also forbids secretive discrimination which is not directly reflected
in the price such as services to some customers and none to others. See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden,
Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1946) ; 80 Cong. Rec. 9415-19 (1936).
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trade act.4 9 Such practices may be especially lucrative in view of the
unprecedented expansion of the discount houses and the absence of
specific affirmative remedies available to the small retailer. 50
49. Very often the retailer will continue to sell a well known trade-marked item in spite
of a reduction in customers induced by the price cutting of larger competitors. FTC, Report
on Resale Price Maintenance 7 (1945). However, the greatest overall proponent and
exploiter of adequate and vigorous enforcement is undoubtedly the retailer. For an inter-
esting discussion of the possible repercussions the manufacturer may find in trying to
terminate fair trade contracts, see The Not-So-Fair Trade Laws, Fortune, Jan. 1940, pp.
70-71; The Fair Trade Controversy, Fortune, April 1949, p. 75.
While in theory horizontal price fixing, or price constraints between sellers on a given level
are illegal under the antitrust laws, in actual economic practice it can readily be seen that
incidentally, uniform and effective enforcement is often an affirmative instrumentality in
inducing or aiding price fixing of a horizontal nature. Through pressure on manufacturers,
retailer associations are often able to obtain a desired markup and are instrumental in
establishing the resale prices of commodities especially in the less competitive fields. See
Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
Resale Price Maintenance, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 n.4 (1952); FTC, Report on Resale
Price Maintenance LX, 520, 546 (1945).
50. This statement is of course contingent on the nature of the commodity which is fair
traded and the character of the business engaged in, i.e., whether highly competitive or not.
No doubt in the absence of the "discount house" factor a retail boycott would be extremely
effective against any favoritism or discrimination practiced by the manufacturer. Another
factor to be considered is whether the profits garnished from discrimination would offset
the effects on the manufacturer's fair traded item and the price identification therewith.
See Hearings, supra note 49, at 174, 344-45. But where the manufacturer is able to dis-
criminate in favor of the large discount house his profits will be greater per unit sale, since
distribution costs may be significantly lowered. See Weiss, Mass Marketing to "400" Mass
Retailers 3, 356 (1950).
Trade-marked goods are particularly susceptible to "loss leader" selling (selling one
product at a loss to attract more customers, in the hope that they will in turn buy other
items to make up the loss and increase the overall profits) because of their widespread
reputation. However such a practice may also result in a shrinkage of the manufacturer's
market since some retailers may be unable to complete in the face of such competition.
There is also considerable opinion that loss leader-selling- is not unethical but a legitimate
merchandising technique. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary on H.R.
No. 1611, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); also Haring, Retail Price Cutting and Its Control
(1935).
In the face of discriminatory enforcement practices on the part of the manufacturer, the
retailer is often unable to get an injunction against the manufacturer to prevent him from
inadequate or discriminatory enforcement. For example, § 369-b of the N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law like most of the statutes, makes selling at less that the stipulated fair trade price
by the retailer illegal, but the statute makes no express prohibition against allowing such
underselling. Even where the court may find that the retailer has a cause of action against
the manufacturer for allowing such underselling, still it is doubtful that the courts will
grant affirmative relief in the form of a positive decree to compel the manufacturer to
effectively enforce his fair trade agreements. Cf. Walsh, Equity § 66 (1930).
As a matter of practice the courts will not grant a declaratory judgment in favor of the
retailer where he has not joined all the necessary parties to the action, which oftentimes
is practically impossible or economically unfeasible. Weissbard v. Potter Drug & Chemical
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While fair trade legislation has ostensibly been enacted to protect the
manufacturer's reputation and the "good will" which he has established
in his trade-marked products,51 the protection of the small retailer from
ruinous competition with his larger counterparts and from undue con-
centration of the avenues of distribution in the hands of few retailers is
also equally within the purview of the act.5 s Because of inadequacies
within the acts themselves, the retailer may often be left in a precarious
position. If, faced with price cutting competitors, he undersells the
stipulated fair trade price in an effort to compete with other price cutting
retailers he is subject to suit5 3 and if he maintains the fair traded price
while waiting for relief from the courts, he may expose his business to
economic ruination. 54  Even though the manufacturer may have been
discriminatory in his enforcement program, if the suit is brought by
competing retailers the defense that the manufacturer was not diligent in
enforcing his fair trade contracts will be insufficient55 unless it is shown
that the manufacturer has in fact abandoned the fair trade contract.
Corp., 6 N.J. Super. 451, 69 A.2d 559 (Ch. 1949); Stockman v. Wilson Distilling Co.,
175 Misc. 314, 23 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1940). While the retailer may have a cause of
action against other violators of the fair trade contract where he has been damaged by
their underselling, to effectively combat them he may often have to incur the expense of a
protracted series of suits against them as each violation occurs. Cf. Fogel v. Bolet, 194 Misc.
1019, 1022, 91 N.Y.S.2d 642, 646 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (dictum).
51. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936),
where the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of state fair trade legislation in
that it protects the manufacturer's property interest in his brand name. See Miller, Unfair
Competition 231-32 (1941); see also Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale
Price Maintenance, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 825, 832-35 (1955) for an excellent short discus-
sion of the advantages of fair trade to the manufacturer.
52. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 109 F. Supp. 269, 272
(E.D. La. 1953); FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance XXVI-XXVII, 52-56 (1945).
See also FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1934).
53. See notes 31-33 supra.
54. See note 50 supra. Small retailers or retailers with undiversified products may not
be able to cut their prices sufficiently to meet the competition of larger distributors. See
Miller, Unfair Competition 249-57 (1941).
55. Whitaker Pharmacy, Inc. v. Pinkiert Supply Store, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(1957 Trade Cas.) ff 68879 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 1957); Fisher v. Rothberg, CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. (1955 Trade Cas.) ff 68029 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
There is nothing to prevent a manufacturer from inducing some friendly retailer to bring
suit against a retailer who price cuts since the retailer's cause of action is not derivative
from that of the manufacturer. See Burstein v. Charline's Cut Rate, 126 N.J. Eq. 560, 10
A.2d 646 (Ch. 1940).
Whether the various states are prone to approve or disapprove the rationale of the fair
trade acts is reflected in the defenses which are allowed to the retailer where he places the
enforcement policy of the manufacturer in issue. See Fogel v. Bolet, 194 Misc. 1019, 91
N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
FAIR TRADE.
Where the manufacturer has formed fair trade agreements he must
use reasonable diligence to enforce the stipulated prices. 6 However, as
pointed out in General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co.,17 "the precise
elements of an adequate enforcement program are not prescribed by law.
Enforcement activities may take such form as is called for by the nature
of the product, the industry, and the violations by the retailers, providing
they add up to a reasonable and diligent effort in the light of all the
facts."r5 s That court, while not attempting to set forth in detail the
requirements of a satisfactory enforcement program, outlined certain
basic essentials. The manufacturer or producer should: (1) keep in-
formed as to price cutting activities and other trends generally known;
(2) keep prior violators under close scrutiny and take necessary action;
(3) investigate and vigorously follow up complaints; (4) if necessary,
enforce fair trade prices by repeated legal action; (5) pursue a continuing
and sustained enforcement program. 59 Thus, where the manufacturer has
completely failed to enforce his contract, injunctive relief against price
violators will not be granted. But where he has permitted one or two
violations, such will not constitute a defense to an enforcement action. 60
Where the line of demarcation is drawn as to the use of reasonable dili-
gence in an enforcement policy is uncertain and the courts have generally
refrained from setting forth definitive requirements for injunctive relief.
Thus a resort to general standards and the particular facts of each case
must be had in intermediate cases and often irreconcilable results will
ensue.
61
The fair trade acts do not bind a manufacturer to institute legal action
when he has knowledge of price violations.6 2 He may resort to a warning
56. See Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. New Cut Rate Liquors Inc., 221 F.2d 815 (7th Cir.
1955). Where the lack of enforcement takes place in one state a retailer may not raise
such as a defense in another state. General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Cooperative, Inc.,
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1956 Trade Cas.) if 68341 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1956).
57. 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct.), injunction vacated on plaintiff-
respondent's motion, 278 App. Div. 939, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't 1951).
58. Id. at 95, 103 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
59. Id. at 98-99, 103 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
60. Friedman v. Peller, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1951 Trade Cas.) if 62776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1951). The general defense of inadequate or discriminatory enforcement is a "clean hands"
defense and can be pleaded without specification of details. Sunbeam Corp. v. Hess Bros.,
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1957 Trade Cas.) if 68654 (Pa. C.P. 1957). See 28 Am. Jur.,
Injunctions § 33 (1940). Some state legislatures have provided for an absolute defense of
nonenforcement under which specifications of persons and dates must be made. See e.g.,
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 8 (Supp. 1957).
61. Compare General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., note 57 supra, with General Elec.
Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1955 Trade Cas.) if 68098
(E.D. Wis. 1955).
62. See Calvert Distilling Co. v. Gold's Drug Stores, 123 N.J. Eq. 458, 198 Atl. 536
(Ch. 1938).
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against future violations63 or if he does resort to legal action he need not
sue all violators at the same time. 64
Where the petitioner himself has violated the fair trade agreement"
or where he has encouraged violations66 such may constitute an abandon-
ment of his contract and will be a complete defense to an injunction action
against a retailer. Since the fair trade acts were partially promulgated to
protect the "good will" of the manufacturer's fair traded product, where
he has established such by false claims or misleading advertisement it
would be consistent to deny him injunctive relief against price violators.
REMEDIES OF PERSONS DAMAGED
The remedy sought by the person damaged by the price cutting may
be in the form of a suit for damages, brought either against a party to
the fair trade contract for breach of the contract or by nonsigners under
the unfair competition provisions. However, such actions for damages
are unusual because of the difficulty of proving that financial losses are
causally related to the violation.67 Even if a drop in volume of sales
could be shown following a price cutting, it would be difficult to show a
legal chain of causation between the price cutting and drop in volume.
Since a suit for damages, even if recoverable, provides compensation only
for past injuries, it is generally coupled with a request for injunctive
relief to protect against future violations. In fact, obtaining an injunc-
tion restraining sales below the fair trade price has been deemed the only
practical method of enforcement.68
Specific money damage need not be alleged to obtain injunctive relief.
The Court of Appeals of New York pointed out this lack of need of
money damages in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker.69 The court stated, "the
'assault upon the good will' is the injury or damage resulting from the
unfair competition, and is actionable under the statute even though proof
of specific money damages is not supplied.""
The ordinary principles followed by a court of equity in granting
injunctive relief are of course adhered to in suits brought to enforce fair
63. See National Distillers Products Corp. v. Columbus Circle Liquor Stores, Inc., 166
Misc. 719, 2 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1938). One suit may be a warning to other violators.
Calvert Distilling Co. v. Gold's Drug Stores, supra note 62.
64. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. The Economy Sales Co., 127 F. Supp. 739 (D.
Conn. 1954).
65. Frank Fischer Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 105, 19 A.2d 454
(Ch. 1941).
66. Schenley Distributors, Inc. v. H. Hollander Co., 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.
1956) ff 3268.23 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1940).
67. Weigel, The Fair Trade Laws 78 (1938).
68. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Stockman, 26 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
69. 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950).
70. Id. at 70, 96 N.E.2d at 181.
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trade contracts. The Supreme Court in Yakus v. United States71 pointed
out that the award of an injunction is a matter of sound judicial discre-
tion in the exercise of which the court balances the conveniences of the
parties and possible injuries to them as they may be affected by the
granting or withholding of the injunction.
A preliminary injunction is frequently sought in order to stop the price
cutting quickly. The failure to obtain a preliminary injunction may
mean, in effect, the loss of the case for the plaintiff, particularly if the
delay until trial allows the defendant to cut prices during a peak selling
season.712 Preliminary injunctions are denied when the defendant shows
the probable existence of a substantial issue of fact or law.73 The need
for the drastic remedy must be established.74 In General Elec. Co. v.
Masters Mail Order Co. 75 a temporary injunction was denied because it
was not a certain or probable cause for assuming that the plaintiff would
prevail at the trail and it was not shown that the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable harm. The court took into consideration that the plaintiff was
a large national organization with distributors throughout the United
States and would not be irreparably harmed by the comparatively incon-
sequential transactions of the defendant. Other courts have not been as
strict in determining the amount of harm necessary to constitute the
"irreparable injury." In Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. The Economy
Sales Co.7 6 the court stated, "generally today, if a plaintiff comes within
the purview of the Fair Trade Act, then violations and the threat of con-
tinued violations entitle him to injunctive relief."177 A temporary injunc-
tion was granted in that case where it was shown that the injunction would
not cause great injury to the defendant. Other courts have granted the
temporary injunction, reasoning that no harm could come to the defendant
by prohibiting him from violating the fair trade law. 8
SCOPE OF INJUNCTION
Since a court exercising equity powers can enter a decree which will
safeguard the rights of the parties, the scope of the injunctions issued has
71. 321 U.S. 414,440 (1944).
72. Lionel Corp. v. R. H. Macy & Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1955 Trade Cas.)
11 67949 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
73. Goldman v. Margolis, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1956 Trade Cas.) II 68535 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1956); Kem Plastic Playing Cards, Inc. v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(1956 Trade Cas.) fI 68440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
74. The Cal. Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1957 Trade Cas.) II 68672
E.D. Pa. 1957); The Parker Pen Co. v. E. J. Korvette Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1955
Trade Cas.) ff 68025 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
75. 122 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
76. 127 F. Supp. 739 (D. Conn. 1954).
77. Id. at 741.
78. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Stockman, 26 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
FAIR TRADE19581
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
varied widely. In Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. May's Drug Store Inc.,"°
the court stated the case against the granting of a blanket injunction. That
court held that the injunction should be limited to the contracts referred to
in the petition and the violations established at the trial. In New York
it has been held that an injunction covering violations of fair trade con-
tracts not alleged in the complaint or established at the trial and includ-
ing within its terms products not even dealt with by the defendant was in
effect an injunction at the instance of one retailer restraining the defendant
from violating the fair trade act generally."0 However, in a recent decision
a lower New York court, in Ampex Corp. v. Goody Audio Center, Inc.,."
held that the plaintiff, having established that the defendant violated
the pertinent statute, was entitled to injunctive relief not only with respect
to the specific items involved, but as to all other of the plaintiff's products
similarly price fixed so as to protect him from any future violations of
the same kind. The court felt that only by such a broad injunction could
the intent of the legislature in passing the fair trade act be carried out.
In Weisstein v. Freeman's Wines & Liquors', Inc.' it was reasoned that
such a broad decree in no manner increased the burden put on the defend-
ant by law.
The injunction may also be made conditional or contingent. The con-
ditioning of an injunction on future behavior of the plaintiff is employed
by the courts in order to afford the plaintiff relief while at the same time
protecting the defendant against any future lapses in conduct.8 3 Where
the defendant showed that numerous other violations of the fair trade
contract had occurred, a New Jersey court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion on the condition that the plaintiff take action within thirty days
against other violators.8 4 Where the defendant in General Elec. Co. v.
R. H. Macy & Co.' showed that during an early period the enforcement
policy of the plaintiff was a limited one, the court granted an injunction
conditioned on the continuation by the plaintiff of a vigorous enforce-
ment policy.
An injunction may include prohibitions beyond the terms of the fair
trade statute. Where the injunction prohibits generally any sale below
the price fixed in a schedule, closing out sales at less than that price are
79. 229 Iowa 554, 294 N.W. 756 (1940).
80. Eton Chemists, Inc. v. Sussman, 278 App. Div. 899, 104 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1st Dep't
1951).
81. 5 Misc. 2d 1072, 163 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
82. 169 Misc. 391, 7 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
83. Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp., 132 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1943).
84. Fishman v. Kaye, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1950 Trade Cas.) ff 62718 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1950).
85. 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd and judgment vacated on plaintiff-
respondent's motion, 278 App. Div. 939, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't 1951).
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also prohibited, although they would be legal if only the fair trade law
were concerned.8
Where the retailer is able to successfully defend against an injunction
action because of the manufacturer's lack of diligent enforcement or be-
cause of his discriminatory practices, the retailer may have unwittingly
left himself in a quandary. Because the manufacturer is prevented from
enjoining violations, the courts may have opened the door to unmitigated
violations by contracting and noncontracting retailers who had been
bound under the contract. No doubt, the benefits of the fair trade act will
be lost to the manufacturer by the imposition of the successful defense
but the substantial victim of the manufacturer's suit may ironically be
the retailer himself."7
CONCLUSION
It is suggested that where the manufacturer has been defeated in his
action to enjoin, the courts should be primarily concerned with a rejuvena-
tion of an effective enforcement policy. If such can be accomplished the
manufacturer will continue to gather the benefits of fair trade and the
retailer will be relieved of future debilitory discrimination. In the past
a temporary injunction has generally been denied where the defendant re-
tailer has adequately and sufficiently alleged discrimination." Neverthe-
less, the courts should take a flexible position which would best inure
to the benefit of both parties. Such could be accomplished by conditioning
the granting of an injunction on the instigation of positive action against
86. General Elec. Co. v. Central C.U. Purchasing Agency, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1950
Trade Cas.) ff 62655 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
Just as the courts vary in the scope of the injunction, they differ as to the enforcement of
the injunction in contempt proceedings which may be brought for violations of the injunc-
tion. Compare Sunbeam Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1957 Trade
Cas.) ff 68784 (R.I. Sup. Ct. July 24, 1957) where a retailer who had been enjoined from
price cutting at "its place of business" was not held in contempt where subsequent sales were
made at a customer's home and in the street outside the entrance to the retailer's store, with
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Masters, Inc., 7 Misc. 2d 185, 153 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
where the court held that the injunction had been violated when the retailer advised its
customers that the product could be purchased by mail order from a Washington, D.C.
affiliate at less than the New York fair trade price.
Defenses to a fair trade enforcement action cannot be asserted or held valid in a contempt
action. In such a situation the proper remedy would be to apply to the court for a
modification of the injunction or a vacation of the order. General Elec. Co. v. Bernfield,
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1951 Trade Cas.) ff 62794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
87. See note 30 supra.
88. Usually the defendant-retailer will allege discrimination by means of affidavits. Thus
some courts have denied a motion for a temporary injunction on the grounds that the
issues raised by the affidavits require a full trial. The Parker Pen Co. v. E. J. Korvette Co.,
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1955 Trade Cas.) ff 68025 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
